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NEC TAMEN CONSUMEBATUR.
Exodus 3 and the Non-Consumable Other
in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
by The Rev. Michael Purcell
BREVARD Childs, reflecting on the significance of Exodus 3in the history of theology, comments:
In the history of Christian theology most of the major theologi-
cal problems have entered into the discussion of Exodus 3. In
the early and medieval periods the interest focused on the issue
of ontology and divine reality; in recent years on revelation as
history or history as revelation. The amazing fact is how seminal
this one passage continues to be for each new generation.1
What insights can be gleaned from the account of the encoun-
ter between God and Moses for theology today? The purpose
of this paper is to show how Exodus 3 can be considered as a
locus classicus for understanding, not simply the encounter
between God and Moses, but the dynamic of all inter-personal
encounter on the human level. In particular, the image of the
bush which burns without being eaten up provides an exodus
from the consumptive and reductive approach to the person
which is so prevalent today. However, if theology and philo-
sophy are to provide an adequate defence of the person, giving
him or her a place beyond the circle of economic activity, then
these also must develop beyond their subject-centred think-
ing. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, deeply rooted in
Jewish tradition and biblical imagery, seems to me to provide
a positive way to go beyond the economics of consumption and
the egological domination of the world which has dominated
Western thinking for so long. Only when the subject is de-
centred will we have a theology which does justice to, and
provides justice for, the other person who stands opposed to
'B. S. CHILDS, Exodus, SCM Press, London, 1987, p.88.
79
80 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
us.2 Ultimately, a person cannot be presented in terms of
economics, but in terms of responsibility.
Moses and the burning bush: a preliminary reflection.
... (he) came to Horeb, the mountain of God. And the angel
of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire out of the midst
of a bush; and he looked, and lo, the bush was burning, yet it
was not consumed. (Ex.3:l-2 RSV)
The encounter, as told in Exodus 3, presents a number of
elements which lend themselves to developing a non-con-
sumptive understanding of the human person which both
founds personal subjectivity and respects the difference of the
other.
(i) The interruption of Moses' ordinary activity by the
fire from the midst of the bush.
(ii) The curiosity and fascination of Moses in the pres-
ence of the bush.
(iii) The voice from the bush addresses Moses.
(iv) Moses responds.
(v) The maintained distance between Moses and the
bush, and the holiness of the place.
In short, the initiative originates from a source other than
Moses, and Moses has to be appreciated as essentially passive
before the bush. Speaking of this encounter, Childs employs
Gressman's classic formulation: 'The discoverer (Entdecker)
2One might question the legitimacy of employing scripture as a basis for philo-
sophical reflection with the danger of a weakening of the rigour of philosophical
thinking. But perhaps Emmanuel Levinas is correct to say: 'At no moment did the
Western philosophical tradition in my eyes lose its right to the last word; everything
must, indeed, be expressed in its tongue; but perhaps it is not the place of the first
meaning of beings, the place where meaning begins.' (Ethics and Infinity, p.24-25)
The first place of meaning is in the encounter which takes place between two people.
Insofar as the text of Exodus Jis the encounter par excellence be tween two people who
maintain themselves in separation and distinction one from the other it is an original
source of meaning which is food for reflection not only on the theological level, but
also on the philosophical level.
NEC TAMEN CONSUMEBATUR 81
has become the discovered {Entdeckte) .'3 As a fusion of two
traditions, the account has been seen as one in which 'Moses
the "discoverer of God" in the local etiology becomes the
"discovered by God" in the call',4 and the theological signifi-
cance is that of a God who is always with us as prevenient grace,
a 'God whose reality has not been discovered but revealed'.5
The terms of the relationship are reversed. 'The initiative is
shifted from Moses to God.'6 It is this reversal which is the key
for developing a proper anthropology, for in place of the
egological and dominating subject, we propose a responsive
and responsible subject whose very subjectivity is called forth
by an other who is always and already prior.
Moses does not go in search of his experience. In fact, he
is presented 'as totally oblivious even to the possibility of the
confrontation to follow'.7 He finds himself in the presence of
the bush, a mysterium fascinans, which attracts him and draws
him closer. Upon his approach, he is addressed. For Childs,
this address has ^ro^/j^icsignificance. It is not simply another
call narrative in which God makes himself manifest. 'The
patriarchs received revelation in theophanies, but had no
commission to transmit a message to others.... Moses' call
recounts the deep disruptive seizure of a man.'8 The prophetic
word first of all comes from God and disrupts Moses, so that,
his life having been re-ordered he can, in his turn, be disrup-
tive of the lives of others through his announcing the pro-
phetic word he has received. Writing of the power of and the
nature of eschatological prophecy, Levinas says that its import
3B. CHILDS, op.cit., p.54 It is not my purpose to enter into the debate over the
various levels and traditions which are incorporated in to this story, but to take the text
as it stands. Childs terms 'insightful' the early work of Habel, who divides the episode
into (i) the divine confrontation (1-3, 4a), (ii) the introductory word (4b-9), (iii)
commission (10), (iv) objection (11), (v) reassurance (12a), (vi) sign (12). How can
the dynamic of such an encounter, with its various moments, help us to articulate the
dynamic of human inter-relations? Rather than transfer the insights of person-to-
person relations to the human-divine relationship, how does an understanding of the
human-divine relationship modify and correct our understanding of the person-to-
person relation?
4CHILDS, op.cit., p.72.
5CH1LDS, op.cit. p.87.
6CHILDS, op.cit., p.72.
'J. I. DURHAM, Word Biblical Commrntary 3:EXODUS, Word Books, Texas, 1987, p.30.
"CHILDS, op.cit. p.56. Italics my own.
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lies in the 'institution of a relation with being beyond the
totality or beyond history'.9 The prophet is related to 'a surplus
always exterior to the totality, as though the objective totality
did not fill out the true measure of being, as though another
concept, the concept of infinity, were needed to express this
transcendence with regard to totality, non-encompassable
within a totality and as primordial as totality'.10 The prophetic
experience is situated within the totality and history, but it
disrupts that totality. Interruption leads on to disruption.
Once the voice has fissured Moses' ordinary experience,
Moses is summoned to respond. 'The story of Exodus 3 is
characteristic of the biblical approach in joining the act of
God's self-disclosure with the call for commitment from its
recipient'.11 In responding, 'Here I am' to the glory revealed in
the bush, Moses becomes responsible. In evoking his response,
the presence in the bush confers the 'ability-to-respond', and
Moses is responsibility. 'The glory of the Infinite is the anarchic
identity of the subject flushed out without being able to slip
away. It is the ego led to sincerity, making signs to the other, for
whom and before whom I am responsible, of this very giving of
signs, that is, of this responsibility: "here I am".'12
Finally, God, in the burning bush, draws close, presents
himself, but in such a way that he remains at a distance. The
burning bush is not consumed. Because the presence in the
burning bush is utterly beyond the comprehensive capacity of
Moses, it remains 'beyond'. As Levinas says,
'The 'invisible God' is not to be understood as God invisible to
the senses, but God non-thematisable in thought, and none-
9E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity, Martinus NijhofT, The Hague, 1979, p.22.
Hereafter, TI.
'°E. LEVINAS, TI, 22-23. For a concise explanation of the philosophical notion of
infinity in the present context, see E. Levinas, Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity, in
Collected Philosophical Papers, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1987. The main point is that
infinity is not so much a matter of distance, but rather that, even in his proximity to
us, the other still remains beyond our possibilities of comprehension. The Cartesian
insight, in Meditations on First Philosophy, of the subject's idea of infinity is an insight
into the fact that, in thinking the infinity, the subject actually thinks more than it
thinks, for the ideatum surpasses its idea.
"CHILDS, op.cit. 88-89.
12ELEVINAS, Othenvisethan Beingor Beyond Essence, A. Lingis (tr), Martinus Nijhoff,
the Hague, 1981, p.144.
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theless as non-indifferent to the thought which is not
thematisation, and probably not even an intentionality.13
Using the notion of the bush which burns without being
consumed, I should like to develop Levinas' placing of the
person beyond the world of economic activity.
The consumptive self and the non-consumable other:
Emmanuel Levinas, in Existence and Existents14, contrasts the
dynamic of eating with that of loving.
Let us take some time to look at the example of food; it is
significant for us because of the place it occupies in everyday
life, but especially because of the relationship between desire
and its satisfaction which it represents, and which constitutes
what is typical of life in the world. What characterises this
relationship is a complete correspondence between desire and
its satisfaction. Desire knows perfectly well what it wants. And
food makes possible the realisation of its intention. At some
moment everything is consummated.15
The need to eat is basic. Hunger drives all of us towards
consumption, and there is a basic correlation between the
emptiness experienced in hunger and the filling of our stom-
achs. For Levinas, eating manifests that structure of solipsistic
or pagan existence which so often characterises life in the
world. A lack within us is felt, and in filling that lack we are
satisfied. Consumption is sincere. There is complete corre-
spondence between the intention and its fulfilment. 'Life is a
sincerity',16 devoid of ulterior motive. It is such a correspond-
ence between the experience of a need and its possibility of
"LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, R. A. Cohen (tr),
Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1985, p.109. (First published as Elhique el
lnfini, 1982.)
MEMMANUEL LEVINAS, Existence and Existents, Alphonso Lingis (tr), Martinus
NijholT, The Hague, 1978. Hereafter, EE.
Edith Wyschogrod, in Emmanuel Levinas: The problem of ethical metaphysics. The Hague,
1974, points out that whereas in his later works Levinas uses the term 'desire' to
'designate an effect inadequate to its object' (p.20) in his earlier works, such as
Existence and Existents, 'desire', like 'need' is satiable.
l5ibid, p.43.
16ibid., p.44.
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being satisfied which is at the root of the whole economic
order, with its market of supply and demand. A lack is experi-
enced, a possibility to fill it recognised and grasped, and an
exchange takes place. Such is the simplicity, the attraction of
the force of Marxist philosophy, whose point of departure is
'economic man'. 'It situates itself in the perspective of the
sincerity of intentions; the good will of hunger and thirst, and
the ideal of struggle and sacrifice it proposes, the culture to
which it invites us, is but the prolongation of these inten-
tions.'17
The economic relationship is much to the fore today and
human inter-activity is often seen to be grasped in terms of
market economics; yet such an articulation of human relations
is itself economical. While it is true that '[n]o human or
interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of
economy.. ..',18 the notion of homo oeconomicus is inadequate to
express the reality of human social life. Ultimately, human life
'occurs beyond economic activity and the world'.19 Any proper
reflection upon the person has to be placed beyond the realm
of economics, and situated in the realm of ethics, for ethics is
first philosophy. The danger of the economic model is that it
is ultimately destructive. In its ingestive approach to what is
other, nothing remains alien and at a distance, but is envel-
oped, its own integrity swallowed up and destroyed in its being
reduced to the same. Most basically, ingestion takes what is
other and incorporates it into the same. As Levinas says,
eating, as the satisfaction of need, is 'the first movement of the
Same'. To engage in an economic approach to the world is to
create a centripetal movement in that world where all that is
other is drawn towards the self. 'The first movement of economy
is in fact egoist.'20 It is a life without transcendence, a pagan
existence, a Heideggerian world. Through his economic activ-
ity, the subject draws things to himself, deprives them of their
independence, depositing them in the interiority of the home,
which is firstly that place of refuge and security whose purpose
17E LEVINAS, EE, 45.
I8E LEVINAS, TI, 172.
19ibid., p.43.
S0E LEVINAS, 77, p. 157.
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is to be hospitable to the proprietor. The home is essentially
inferiority and exclusion of what is other; it is that place which
I inhabit before every other inhabitant.21 'In economy... there
is brought about the totalisation of absolutely singular be-
ings. >22 Economy is 'the human totality' ,23 The exclusion of the
other person can have tragic consequences, for ultimately, the
power of economics is that of reducing the other person to the
status of a consumable, devoid of any exteriority. It is, in effect,
an annihilation of his or her existence, an obliteration which
manifests itself most clearly in war and hostility which, like
consumption, 'destroys the identity of the same'.24 To situate
an other within an economic totality is not only to create the
situation where Joseph is sold into slavery by his brothers, but
also that in which Abel is murdered by his brother Cain.25
!
'The classic philosophical articulation of such a subject-centred world is surely
evident in Heidegger's Being and Time, where the world is presented as something
which is there ultimately as a possibility for the subject's own being, and things within
the world are ontologically defined by their relationship to Dasein. Speaking of the
involvement of things (Zevge) within the world he writes: 'The fact that it has such an
involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an
ontological assertion about it. That in whicli it is involved is the "towards-which" of
serviceability, and the "for-which" of usability.' Using the example of a hammer,
Heidegger develops the notion: the hammer is involved in hammering, which is for
making something fast, for protection against bad weather, and this is ultimately for
the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter tor Dasein.' Dasein is that being who is 'the sole
authentic "for-the-sake-of-which"' all other entities are. (Beingand Time,]. McQuarrie
(tr), Harper and Row, NY, 1962, pp.116-117.)
One would have to recognise, however, that in his later work Hokwege, where he
speaks of the power of poetry, the subject is called into question by the poetic word
addressed to him. Mark Taylor, in Allarily, (University' Press of Chicago, 1987), in a
chapter on Heidegger entitled 'Cleaving' writes that, for the subject, to be in the
presence of the poetic word, is '[t]o hear the "inhuman", "anonymous", "uncanny"
murmur of the holy [which] is to become open to that which cannot be conceived,
grasped, mastered, or controlled.... By "tolling" (la Uten) the "trace" (Spur) of the holy,
poetry sounds the "death-knell" (Toten-geldul) of the all-knowing, constructive subject
of modern philosophy.' (p.58) In recognising the power of poetry, Heidegger, in his
later work, acknowledges the displacing power which the Other, by speaking, has with
respect to the subject.
HE. LEVINAS The Ego and Totality, in Collected Philosophical Papers, A. Lingis (tr),
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987 (first published in Revue deMetaphysiqueet deMorale, 59, pp.353
-73),p.44.
23ibid., p.45.
24E. LEVINAS, TI, 21.
25Maurice Blanchot, reflecting on the biblical account of Cain's killing of Abel,
asks, 'Why did Cain kill Abel?' Both were engaged in the economics of work and
production, yet Cain maintained himself in an economical framework centred on
himself, which admitted of no place for anything exterior to his own domain. Abel,
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In the economy, every object has a price, and what is of
value (always to the self and never inherent in the object) can
be costed. Money is the 'universal power of acquisition'.26 With
it, there is effected both the reification of the person, his
quantification, and his insertion into a system of exchange in
which a price is applied to everything — the subject becomes
a factor in an economic equation whose value is derived from
within that equation.
In transactions there occurs the action of one freedom on
another. Money, whose metaphysical significance has perhaps
not yet been measured... corrupts the will by the power it offers
it, and is thus a middle term par excellence. At the same time
it maintains individuals outside of the totality, since it disposes
of them, and includes them in the totality, since in commerce
and transactions man himself is bought and sold; money is
always to some extent wages. As exchange value of product it
however, offered the first-fruits to the Lord beyond. Cain affirmed himself as the
centre of life, and God, as exterior, was second; Abel recognised the mastery of the
Lord in his life, acknowledged his presence, placing himself in a position of subser-
vience. Cain and Abel symbolise two differing orders; the economic order of Cain
where the self dominates and others are seen as a function of the self; and the
transcendent order of Abel where recognition is given to the other and response
made. Two orders which the one world is not able to contain. Hence, the only
alternative presents itself to Cain: either Abel can be accommodated within his world
of the self, or Abel can be removed in order that Cain's world survive. And so the first
fratricide — the model of all other murders — is accomplished. As Blanchot
comments, when confronted with the other who contests my power of possession, 'the
choice is dialogue or murder'. Blanchot continues: 'when Cain kills Abel, it is the self
which, confronted with the transcendence of the other person (that which in other
people goes beyond me absolutely and which is well represented in biblical history by
the incomprehensible inequality of divine favour), tries to face up to it through
recourse to the transcendence of murder.
'But are these two transcendences of the same order, and what can discussion of
them signify? To Abel, Cain says; with regard to that by which you claim to go beyond
me, your dimension of infinite and absolutely exterior being, that which places you
beyond my reach, I will show that I am I the master, for insofar as I have power, I am
master of the absolute, and I have made death one of my possibilities.
'It is because, for Cain, this infinite presence of Abel had become an obstacle, like
a thing belonging to Abel and of which he had to deprive him.... Because the presence
of the other to another is not welcomed by the self as a movement by which the infinite
approaches the self, because this presence closes in upon another like a property of
other people in the world, because it ceases to yield to his word, the world ceases to
be big enough to be able to contain at the same time the other and the self, and it is
necessary for one of them to reject the other—absolutely.' {Entrelien InJini.GaWimard,
pp. 86-87)
26E. LEVINAS, The Ego and Totality, p.45.
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acts on the will it flatters, and gets a hold of the person. It is thus
the abstract element in which is brought about the generalisation of that
which has no concept, the equating of that which has no quantity.27
However, '[w]hat is possessed in money is not the object, but
the possession of objects. A possession of possession.. ..',28 and
it is this fact which contains the possibility of the redemption
of money, for it introduces it into the sphere of redemptive
activity, whereby it assumes the character no longer of being,
as Sartre might say, 'pour soi' but 'pour l'autrui'.
The Priceless Other:
An economic approach to the world ultimately fails, for it fails
to do justice to the subject. The engorged self, when it has
eaten and had its fill, still remains empty, for needs rise up
from the satisfaction of needs. Engorgement simply distorts
the person. Weighed down by consumptive obesity, the self
cannot rise beyond its self. Consumption is non-transcendent
activity; its world is without transcendence; it is pagan exist-
ence. What nullifies the economic model is quite simply the
presence of an other who refuses to be consumed and incor-
porated into the self s own world. In his or her approach, the
other person still remains at a distance, and though apparently
within our grasp, rests essentially beyond our reach — and
thereby attractive to us. The acquisitive power of money is thus
called into question, and ultimately rendered powerless by the
resistance of the other person. As absolute refusal, the other
person is without price, not because I cannot afford the cost,
but because he or she is exorbitant29 with respect to any power
I may have, and outwith the economic order. Of all objects in
the world which I can make my own, the other person is the
"ibid., p.44-45.
!8ibid., p.45.
"Such exorbitance is termed by hennas infinity. The concept of infinity is opposed
to that of totality. The totalising tendency seeks to incorporate whatever is other into
some impersonal system embraced by an over-arching concept. Infinity, on the other
hand, signifies the transcendence of the other person who is unable to be compassed
by any thought or by any system, and whose very presence, as infinite, calls into
question the possibility of comprehensive thought and embracive system.
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one who absolutely refuses to be possessed, and who renders
money, as the currency of an economic world, redundant.
This power to contest the power of acquisition and to
overcome come it by rendering it powerless, manifests itself in
the transcendance of the other with respect to us, which
Levinas terms the face (le visage).
[Possession itself refers to more profound metaphysical rela-
tions. A thing does not resist acquisition; the other possessors
— those whom one cannot possess — contest and therefore
can sanction possession itself.... The action that is beyond
labour, presupposing the absolute resistance of the face of
another being, is command and word — or the violence of
murder.30
In other words, things do not resist acquisition; faces do.
Contrasting eating with loving, Levinas goes on to say,
Compare eating with loving, which occurs beyond the eco-
nomic activity of the world. For what characterises love is an
essential and insatiable hunger. To shake hands with a friend
is to express one's friendship for him, but it is to convey that
friendship as something inexpressible, and indeed as some-
thing unfulfilled, a permanent desire. The very positivity of love
lies in its negativity. The burning bush that feeds the flames is not
consumed.31
That human voracity and its satisfaction is not an adequate
model for understanding what it is to be human is seen in the
limited resource which nature now presents. The consuming
fire of human need threatens the human life-world. The
planet itself seems unable to bear our needs. But at a more
fundamental level, the economic dynamic of need and its
fulfilment fails to satisfy, for what the human person is ori-
ented towards is a reality which fails to satisfy our hunger, not
because that reality is inadequate to our emptiness, but be-
cause it is so much beyond our capacity to bear it. In our
relationship with other people, what we seek is not the satisfac-
'"E. LEVINAS, 77, p. 162.
31E. LEVINAS, EE, p.43.
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don of all our hungers, but the joy of being continually hungry.
We seek the presence of an other whom we can never con-
sume, who refuses our consumptive approaches, yet, who in
the negativity of their availability, feeds our desire by their
incomprehensible presence to our comprehensive grasping.
The trouble one feels before the beloved does not only precede
what we call, in economic terms, possession, but is felt in the
possession too. In the random agitation of caresses there is the
admission that access is impossible, violence fails, possession is
refused.32
It is important to distinguish between desire and need. Desire
(Le Desir) is not geared towards sensual enjoyment (la
puissance); rather it brings pleasure (plaisir). Enjoyment, how-
ever, comes about as the result of a need being satisfied, and
is the first sign of subjectivity, the first mark of humanity.
Enjoyment can thus be viewed as a kind of egoism. Its concern
is the subject, and the subject as a focus for manifold sensual
experiences. Aristotle makes this point when he says in Meta-
physics, 1 that the human desire for knowledge can be seen,
at a first level, in 'the delight that we take in our senses; quite
apart from the use we make of them, we take delight in them
for their own sake...'33 Levinas himself says: 'In enjoyment, I
am absolutely for myself. I am an egoist without reference to
anyone else — I am alone in solitude, innocently egotistical
and alone.... I am completely deaf to other people.'34 In
enjoyment I am completely caught up with the object, which
satisfies me, and this satisfaction is enjoyment. Human liv-
ing is not, however, simply enjoyment; it is pleasure and
delight. The enjoyment of eating is complemented by the
pleasure of good company. Need, and the satisfaction that the
object brings, does not acknowledge the presence of some-
thing beyond us. Need seeks to incorporate the object we
35loc.cit.
"ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, Book 1.
'"'Dans lajouissance.je suis absolument pour moi. Egoistc sans reference a amriii
— je suis seul sans solitude, innocement egoiste et scul. Pas contre les autres, pas
"quanta moi" — mais enticrement sourd a autrui' (77).
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intend into our own world. We want to make it our own, and
when we possess it we are satisfied and happy. Desire, on the
other hand, is not oblivious to the presence of the other but
moves towards the other. Need is the anxiety which the T has
for itself (/ 'anxiete du Moi pour soi), but desire is called forth by
an other. In his ' Cantique des Colonnes , Valery speaks of 'desir
sans defaut', referring to Plato, who in his analysis of pure
pleasures, discovers an aspiration which is unconditioned by
any lack. This is desire,35 and it is a desire for what is beyond, is
metaphysics, a movement towards an alien outside-of-oneself
(hors-de-soi), towards a yonder that is termed other in an emi-
nent sense. 'The metaphysical desire tends towards something
else entirely toward the absolutely other.'36 Such a desire is
constant, for it is a desire that cannot be satisfied.37 'The
metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond
everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness —
the Desired does not fulfil it, but deepens it.'58 Desire feeds on
itself, bringing, as it were, new hungers. It cannot satisfy itself
for its term is 'unanticipatable alterity'.39 Take the example of
the one we love. The more we come to know and appreciate
the Beloved, the more we can call the Beloved our own, then
the more is our desire fed. Love is an insatiable force, it is ever
deepening itself. In this sense, it is absolute. The desiring
being is mortal; the Desired invisible. 'To die for the invisible
— that is metaphysics.'40 One can hear here echoes of Augus-
tine. In his Confessions, Augustine asks the question: 'What do
I love when I love my God?'41 and replies:
Not material beauty or beauty of a temporal order; not the
brilliance of earthly light, so welcome to our eyes; not the sweet
melody of harmony and song; not the fragrance of flowers,
55See LEV1NAS, Humanisme de I'autre homme, Fata Morgana, 1972, p.49.
36TI,33.
"TI,34.
' 'idem. 'Le Desirable ne comble pas mon Desire mais le creuse, me nourrisant, en
quelque maniere, de nouvelles faims.'
"idem.
^1,35. Such an 'invisible' is not to be strictly identified with God, who is supremely
Other, but rather with the other person, for we are saying that each person manifests
his own infinity which is utterly beyond possession by the self.
•"Augustine, Confessions, X, 6.
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perfumes or spices; not manna or honey; not limbs such as the
body delights to embrace. It is not these that I love when I love
my God.
In other words, Augustine is excluding as objects of his love or
his desire those things which appeal to his senses and bring
him enjoyment. He goes on:
And yet, when I love him, it is true that I love a light of a certain
kind, a voice, a perfume, a food, an embrace; but they are of the
kind that I love in my inner self, when my soul is bathed in light
that is not bound by space; when it listens to sound that never
dies away; when it breathes fragrance that is not borne away on
the wind; when it tastes food that is never consumed by the
eating; when it clings to an embrace from which it is not severed
by fulfilment of desire. This is what I love when I love my God.
Augustine is saying that the object of his desire is something
which he can never possess or make his own: a food that can
never be consumed, a desire which is never fulfilled. For
Augustine, this desire finds its terminus in God, the infinite
who can never be possessed or consumed by the one desiring.
Elsewhere, he writes, 'You called me; you cried aloud to me;
you broke die barrier of deafness. You shone upon me; your
radiance envelopped me; you put my blindness to flight.... I
tasted you, and now I hunger and thirst for you. You touched
me, and I am inflamed with love of your peace.'42
For Levinas, it is not only God who approaches in tran-
scendence; it is the other person, who, even in proximity,
maintains himself or herself at a distance. The very visibility of
the person bears within it an invisibility which attracts us and
inflames us with desire. One should note the structure of this
desire. It is response to a presence which offers itself to us. For
Augustine, the initiative comes from God, and the self is
addressed, and thereby displaced. The priority of the subject
is contested. The other, as exteriority, becomes the origin and
focus. To de-centre the subject is not to undermine metaphys-
ics, or epistemology; it is rather to defend it by giving it a
foundation built on the idea of infinity. Levinas' project is 'a
"Augustine, op.cit., X, 27.
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defence of subjectivity (for) it will apprehend the subjectivity
not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality,
nor in its anguish before death, but as founded on the idea of
infinity'.43
What this notion of infinity means is that, even though the
other person is proximate in his or her presence, such a
proximity contains within it a paradox. The very presence of
the other person is in excess of our capacity to contain him or
her. It is proximate transcendence. The other person who is
absolutely separate from us is encountered within the world, in
the context of economic life. The non-allergic response which
the other beseeches us to make, the primordial invocation
'Thou shalt not kill',44 is not sought on a disincarnate plane in
some other world. 'No human or interhuman relationship can
be enacted outside of economy."15 The demand for welcome
does not simply entail an openness of heart, but presupposes
the concreteness of the home, which is now not only the place
of withdrawal and recollection, but also the place of welcome
and hospitality. Although the face of the other person reveals
the other in his or her transcendence, such a transcendence
happens within the world, in the context of economic life. The
response which the revelation of the face of the other de-
mands is a concrete and responsible response, which isjustice,
and it is 'justice which must save us from economy, that is, from
the human totality' .46Justice is the concrete response which we
make to an other person, not simply the other who presents
himself to us as possible neighbour, but the other also who is
unknown and unseen.
Money, whose metaphysical significance has not yet been measured:
Money is not simply possession; it is the 'possession of posses-
sion', possession of the ability to possess, the power of acqui-
43LEVINAS,77, 26.
"Although there is the command 'Thou shall not kill, which shines forth from the
face of the other, the possibility of killing is not thereby removed. Moral imperative
is not ontological necessity.
«LEVINAS,77, 172.
46E. LEVINAS, Collected Papers, p.45.
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sition, of making some object mine.47 Insofar as everything has
a price, it is subject to the power of money, whose language is
the commerce of buying and selling. Insofar as money is not
the possession of the object, but the possession of possession,
it is characterised by delay and postponement. In possessing
money, I project possession of the object into a future, but a
future which contains within itself the possibility that it might
not be my future. Money in the bank, as a future power of
acquisition, belongs to a future in which I might have no part,
'for wise men and fools must both perish and leave their wealth
to others' .^ In this sense, saving can be redeeming.
A parallel can be made with work. In place of an Epicu-
rean enjoyment of the moment, the one who engages in work
postpones present enjoyment until a future time. But as future
time, it is a time which may be without me. To labour (travailler)
for some larger project or work (oeuvre) is to adopt an escha-
tology without any hope or liberation for self. It is 'to be for a
time without me, for a time after my own time'.49 Work, as
postponement, is Heidegger's 'Being-unto-death', whereby I
commit myself to a time in which I shall be absent, a time which
is the time of the other. 'Work (oeuvre) is then a relationship
with the other (I'Autre), which is reached without being
touched.'50 It becomes possible only in patience, in indiffer-
ence, and with sacrifice and generosity. Insofar as work,
understood as delay and postponement, is a refusal of present
remuneration, it is liturgical, and ethical. Levinas quotes Leon
Blum: 'We work in the present, not for the present.... May the
future and those things most distant be the rule for all these
present days (Nietzsche) .'5I Insofar as money is also the delay or
postponement of possession, it is not simply the currency of the
economic order, but is introduced into the domain of the ethical.
4
'One need only reflect how the verb possidm (to possess) can be rendered by esse
with the thing possessed being subject and the possessor in the dative. To possess is
to take something self-standing and engulf it into another subject.
"Psalm 49, 10 (Grail).
TOE. LEVINAS, Humanismr de Vautre liomme. Fata Morgana, 1972, p.45 Hereafter,
HAH.
ME. LEVINAS, HAH, p.44.
"LEVINAS, HAH, p.46. "Noustravaillonsrfniiile present, non ponrW present
Que I'avenir et les plus lointaines choses soieni la regie de tons les jours presents
(Nietzsche)'
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Work, then, and its products are not inalienable posses-
sions but can be exchanged and converted into' the anonymity
of money'.52 By becoming anonymous, money is removed
from a sphere which is strictly mine, and introduced into a
domain which is peopled by others. What has been mine now
has the possibility of belonging to an 'other-than-me'. It is this
very postponement which is a characteristic of money, this
present refusal of possession, which constitutes the very
positivity of money. If the negativity of money is its acquisitive
character and assertion of the self with its concomitant reduc-
tion and destruction of the other, it positivity lies in the
possibility of economic justice to which it lends itself. Money,
as the currency of economic justice, is the possibility of doing
justice to the neighbour, for, justice is always recompense and
compensation. To recognise the other as neighbour is to
acknowledge the debt I owe him or her, and thus the relation-
ship is always compensatory. With regard to the other who
stands before me as neighbour and demands justice, money
loses its power of purchase and become a possibility of giving.
The other person who resists my power of possession and
renders it powerless, who cannot; be priced, who renders my
riches inadequate, being beyond their economic reach, trans-
fers money from the domain of destruction to the court of
justice. Money is concrete, and insofar as justice demands a
currency and love demands incarnation, money is a concrete
power for effecting justice, and giving to the other his due. It
is not simply power and possession; it is the possibility of
economic justice. 'Money allows us to envisage a justice of
redemption to be substituted for the infernal or vicious circle
of vengeance and pardon.'53 Money, despite its power of
appropriation, can also be involved in the non-consuming
dynamic of love rather than the consumptive dynamic of
eating.
52LEVINAS, TI, p. 176.
53E. LEV1NAS, Collected Papers, p.45. Levinas does not want to lessen the criticism
of money which has been made from the prophet Amos (2,6) to Marx's Communist
Manifesto, namely 'its power to buy man', but recognises that the distribution ofjustice
must, in some way, be quantifiable. Money, by which the quantification of the person
is achieved, supplies the category for ensuringjustice to others, precisely on account of
its exchange value. There can be notjustice'without quantity and without reparation'.
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The project upon which Levinas embarks is to create a
new metaphysics, ethically founded. He writes,
Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere
the true life to which man, escaping from here, would gain
access in the privileged moments of liturgical, mystical eleva-
tion, or in dying — and a philosophy of immanence in which
we would truly come into possession of being when every
'other' (cause for war), encompassed by the same, would
vanish at the end of history — we propose to describe, within
the unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence...,
a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or
human totality, that is not a totalisation of history but the idea
of infinity. Such a relationship is metaphysics itself.64
In his encounter with the burning bush, Moses experienced
metaphysics. He was summoned and addressed by a reality
which remained beyond him, and which was outwith the
economical order of consumption. Moses responded, and
assumed his prophetic mission. In a real way, the burning bush
is a symbol for every other person, who is always and already
there prior to personal initiative, who is always in excess of our
capacity for containment, and cannot be consumed by our
comprehensive thinking or action. That presence summons
response, and it is only as response to the presence of an other
that economics and its currency is redeemed. Beyond the
economics of consumption there is the demand for justice,
and it is only when economics servesjustice thatjustice is done
to the subject.
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